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ABSTRACT
Medicine regulation worldwide has undergone a process of
regulatory diversification. The evidence-based medicine (EBM)
paradigm, centered on multi-phase randomized controlled
trials, is increasingly contested and replaced by new models
of clinical validation. To explain these changes, STS research
has cited just a few factors, e.g. growing pressure form health
consumers; the role of pharmaceutical companies to lobby
for fast, affordable drug development; the influence of
neoliberal ideas and libertarian advocacy of deregulation; and
the agency of national governments to enable domestic
innovation opportunities in the context of global competition
and inequalities. Those factors individually cannot account for
the increasing variation in medicine regulation at both
national and global levels. Instead it is helpful to integrate
elements of existing explanations into a framework with four
pairs of conflicting regulatory choices, which play a central
role in the formation of medicine regulation. We use this
framework to compare regulatory changes in the USA,
European Union, China, India, Argentina, and Japan. Across
these jurisdictions, the case studies illustrate four dynamics of
diversification. Key regulatory concepts such as evidence, risk,
safety, efficacy, responsibility and accountability acquire
different meanings, reshaping medicine innovation in far-
reaching and often contradictory ways. The boundaries
between medical research and healthcare provision,
commerce and humanitarian service, as well as state control
and medical self-regulation are re-defined.
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Introduction
The regulatory landscape for the clinical testing and approval of new medicines
is in the midst of a phase of change and global diversification. Calls for
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deregulation and the introduction of more flexible and typically less costly regu-
latory requirements are now commonplace in many countries. The multiphase
randomized controlled trial (RCT) system, for many years considered the gold
standard of evidence-based clinical research, has increasingly come under
pressure and is partly replaced by more affordable, less lengthy but often also
less rigorous methodological alternatives.
Japan, for example, introduced a new regulatory framework in 2015 that radi-
cally shortens the drug development process. As a result of this change, investi-
gational medicinal products, gene therapies and regenerative medicine product
can be sold on the market on a conditional basis after an initial stage of clinical
testing in as few as ten patients (Sipp, 2015). In the USA the 21st Century Cures
Act (2016) aimed to accelerate the approval of new medicines, by lowering
requirements to go through rigorous, large-scale phase III trials (Hogle and
Das, 2017; Kesselheim and Avorn, 2017) and by promoting methodological
alternatives such as adaptive and other new trial designs (Montgomery, 2017).
Similar developments can be observed in other countries. India, for instance,
eased rules for clinical research in 2016 and has reportedly halved the time for
the approval and conduct of clinical studies, with further regulatory reforms to
fast track clinical research currently underway (Raghavan, 2016). Also China is
trying to speed up approval for innovative drugs and medicinal products. In
order to develop its pharmaceutical sector, regulators initiated reforms in
2016 that aim to expedite the clinical research process and to accelerate
market approval of urgently needed drugs (Deere, 2016). In both countries
there has also been widespread support for the provision of innovative
medical approaches outside of state controls and without preceding clinical
trials (Rosemann and Chaisinthop, 2016). Regulatory changes in the European
Union, on the other hand, have been less extensive, but health authorities have
introduced a growing number of regulatory changes and exemptions in recent
years, that have aimed to limit the duration and scale of phase III trials and to
broaden access to investigational medicines (Faulkner, 2017).
These developments indicate substantial changes in the culture and politics of
biomedicine today. In this paper we introduce an analytical framework to analyze
and make sense of these regulatory changes in a comparative perspective. For this
purpose we discuss four pairs of conflicting regulatory choices that play a central
role in the formation of medicine regulation. The individual components of this
framework are based on a survey of relevant STS and medical anthropology litera-
ture that provide theoretical perspectives on medicines regulation. We have
focused in particular on texts that examine the drivers, interests and stakeholders
that shape the regulation of newmedicines, as well as writings that explore the role
of global inequalities, international competition and frictions between internation-
ally harmonized regulatory standards and local practices.
We use this framework to analyze recent regulatory developments in stem cell
medicine. Controversies and calls for the use of alternative regulatory models in
2 A. ROSEMANN ET AL.
the stem cell field have been at the forefront of regulatory debates also in other
areas of medicine. In the USA, Europe, Japan, India and China, for instance,
think tanks and lobby groups have used the case of stem cell medicine to cam-
paign for regulatory reform, deregulation and the partial abandonment of the
multi-phase controlled trial system in medical research at a wider level
(Cooper and Waldby, 2014). Regulatory controversies in the stem cell field, in
other words, provide an important analytical window into the global reshaping
of regulatory and clinical realities in medical research.
This article compares regulatory developments for the clinical translation of
stem cell-based treatments in six jurisdictions: Argentina, China, the European
Union, India, Japan and the USA. The following questions underlie our analysis:
How do recent regulatory changes in stem cell medicine diverge from the con-
ventional model of EBM and the use of multiphase randomized controlled trials
in international medicine research, and how do these changes vary across
countries? Which tensions and consequences arise as a result of these changes?
In order to shed light on these questions we, first, introduce the heuristic fra-
mework. Then, in the empirical section we analyze the regulatory conditions and
trends in the above-mentioned jurisdictions. In conclusion we wrap up the
findings by answering the main questions and reviewing the theoretical contri-
bution of this article.
Analytical Perspectives: Beyond EBM Models
To understand the broader process of global diversification that is currently
taking place in medicine research, we have developed a heuristic framework
that is structured around four pairs of conflicting regulatory choices that
underlie the formation of medicine regulation. These conflicting choices,
which become apparent especially in emerging technologies, require the weigh-
ing between diverse options that represent different benefits, risks, interests and
values in terms of economic competitiveness and business profit, safety and
efficacy control, and widening/restricting people’s access to healthcare goods
and services:
. International integration and access to global markets vs. the facilitation of
local innovation and business opportunities
. Rapid development of and early access to new medicines vs. the systematic
testing of safety and efficacy
. The realization of affordable medicines vs. the generation of corporate profits
. State led forms of regulatory controls vs. deregulation and scientific self-
regulation
The development of new regulatory options requires strategic compromises
between these conflicting demands, which result from complex negotiation
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processes between stakeholders (e.g. firms, scientists, regulatory authorities,
lobby groups, physicians, patients, investment groups, health insurances, etc.)
that promote different visions of the future and bioeconomy-based development
pathways.
International Integration and Access to Global Markets vs. the Facilitation
of Local Innovation and Business Opportunities
The creation of a regulatory environment that facilitates participation in inter-
national research projects and that provides access to global markets is a high
priority in many countries. International integration and the use of harmonized
regulatory standards have been associated with the creation of new economic
opportunities and possibilities for joint innovation (Van Zwanenberg et al.,
2011), increased availability of health related products and services, and the
uncomplicated circulation of (biological) materials, patients and professionals
(Parry et al., 2015).
A problem arises, however, in that adherence to internationally harmonized
standards is not always conducive to the realization of domestic innovation and
business opportunities. Historically, large biotech corporations and pharma-
ceutical companies have welcomed regulatory harmonization. These large com-
panies are well-resourced and benefit most from unified regulation (Petryna,
2009). For smaller companies or academic researchers, on the other hand, com-
pliance with international scientific standards and regulatory requirements is
often impracticable and unaffordable, especially in low-to-middle income
countries (Sleeboom-Faulkner et al., 2016). Hence, smaller entities in the biome-
dical sector as well as competitors in less wealthy countries often experience the
adoption of internationally unified standards as a hindering factor, which
impedes local innovation rather than generating benefits (Sleeboom-Faulkner,
2016; Hauskeller et al., 2017).
The integration of local stakeholders into a standardized international biome-
dical sector, thus, gives rise to new forms of stratification that generate new pat-
terns of inclusion and exclusion (Timmermans and Epstein, 2010; Knaapen,
2014). Locally evolved forms of innovation and value production that do not
conform to these international standards are delegitimized and as a result
often shut down (Birch, 2012). There is thus an inherent tension between the
realization of international integration and access to global markets, which
requires harmonized regulation, and the development and protection of dom-
estic market and innovation opportunities, which necessitates a regulatory
environment that corresponds to local needs, ambitions and available resources
(Mikami, 2015).
Most governments seek to strike a compromise between these two aspira-
tions, by creating a regulatory environment that seeks to facilitate participation
in global projects and markets on the one hand, and the stimulation of domestic
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innovation and business opportunities through flexible or locally specific stan-
dards on the other hand. Sleeboom-Faulkner et al. (2016) speak in this regard
of ‘national home-keeping policies,’ a concept that refers to regional or
national-level regulatory strategies that aim to revert and resist the exclusionist
effects of international medicine regulations, by enabling localized approaches of
medical research and commercialization that correspond to local ambitions, cir-
cumstances and available resources. This perspective enables the analysis of
regulatory change as a response to the effects of dominant international stan-
dards in medicine regulation, and in relation to a variety of contextual factors
that range from resource inequalities to differences in national development
strategies, health care needs and regulatory cultures.
Rapid Development of and Access to New Medicines vs. the Systematic
Testing of Safety and Efficacy
Another tension that underlies the formation of regulatory policies for medicine
research emerges from the demands of citizens and patients to realize novel
medical solutions rapidly. Health social movements have sought to influence
the clinical research process in numerous countries (Rabeharisoa et al., 2014).
Many of these movements have organized around the issue of earlier and
more far-reaching access to investigational products, often in the name of per-
sonal autonomy (Blasimme and Vayena, 2016) and social justice (Reardon,
2013).
These claims contradict the slow process of drug development, which requires
the need to generate legitimated scientific evidence for the safety and efficacy of
new treatments. A growing movement for right-to-try medicine (Jacob, 2015) –
which demands early access to experimental treatments outside of the clinical
trial system and before formal market approval – has put increasing strain on
regulatory authorities. This has resulted in regulatory adjustments, and in
some countries far-reaching revisions of drug policies (Salter et al., 2015;
Hogle and Das, 2017).
Salter et al. (2015) have argued in this regard that the global political economy
of medicine research has been shaped by ‘biomedical hegemony’ based on the
legal enforcement of evidence-based medicine standards and multi-stage trials
by state agencies. However, this hegemonic system, which is closely intertwined
with the global expansion of pharmaceutical research, is facing increasing ten-
sions. While the mandatory use of EBM standards ensures the systematic evalu-
ation of safety, efficacy and clinical utility, mounting pressure from consumer
groups has given rise to calls for regulatory adjustments. Due to this pressure,
Salter, Zhou and Datta suggest, governments have started to amend national
regulatory frameworks, which has given rise to new models of medical inno-
vation that stress informed consumer choice, earlier access to experimental
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medical interventions, and the shortening of clinical evaluation procedures
(2015, p. 156).
Demands for the acceleration of the drug development process have also
come from the pharmaceutical industry, often in coalition with patient organiz-
ations and in the name of ‘patient empowerment.’ As Davis and Abraham
(2013) point out, the pharmaceutical industry has been a driving force behind
the adoption of fast track and accelerated review and marketing approval mech-
anisms in the USA and Europe, and this shift toward deregulation does not
always coincide with patients’ interests.
Realization of Affordable Medicines vs. the Generation of Corporate Profits
The development of medicines that are affordable to people and national health
insurance systems, is a requirement to achieve wide-ranging access to new
treatments (Rawlins, 2010). This contrasts with the necessity of biotech and
pharmaceutical companies to generate profits from new drugs that can be
re-invested into research and development (R&D) or paid out to shareholders.
At the same time, the costs of the drug development process have continually
increased over the last few years, which has made it more difficult for corpor-
ations to amortize costs (Rawlins, 2010). But the rising costs of new drugs also
clash with the fact that health insurance systems in many countries are under
pressure. Highly constrained financial resources and demographic transform-
ations – in particular, the expansion in ageing populations – have resulted in
cuts in healthcare budgets and cost-containment measures (Kaplan and
Porter, 2011).
While pharmaceutical companies have shaped, in important ways, drug regu-
lations in high-income countries over the last three decades (Davis and
Abraham, 2013), in recent years there has been increasing criticism from both
healthcare regulators and the industry that the costs of clinical testing and
market approval have become disproportional and that more affordable regulat-
ory alternatives are needed (Rawlins, 2010; Montgomery, 2017). These demands
have resulted in advocacy for alternative clinical trials, especially the use of adap-
tive trial designs, that allow for a greater level of flexibility and reduced costs and
which have become increasingly common in mainstream drug research (Hogle
and Das, 2017; Montgomery, 2017).
Thus there exists a tension between a commitment to the development of safe
and efficient medicines that are affordable to patients and national healthcare
systems, on the one hand, and the generation of sufficient corporate profits,
on the other hand. It is noteworthy that regulatory responses to this problem
are also influenced by differences in healthcare expectations. As Peters et al.
(2008) have shown, patients’ expectations of healthcare vary considerably
across societies. In high-income countries with well-established health care
systems patients expectations for widely available, high-quality healthcare
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services are usually much higher than in countries with less well-established
healthcare systems. In most low-and-middle income countries, for example,
the expectations of medical services are often lower on average and the accept-
ability of private payments as well as potentially ineffective and unsafe drugs is
higher (Peters et al., 2008). These factors influence regulatory decision-making,
including the decisions taken by healthcare providers, companies and biomedi-
cal entrepreneurs (Sleeboom-Faulkner, 2016).
State-led Forms of Regulatory Control vs. Deregulation and Scientific Self-
regulation
Regulatory controls for market approval of new medicines have in the last
decades primarily lain in the hands of the state. Co-developed with the pharma-
ceutical industry, state-led regulatory procedures have stabilized product
approval pathways and created a route to the market that has sought to
protect the interests of patients, trial participants and drug producers (Roman,
2014). In recent years, however, calls for increased choice among patients and
more affordable drugs have resulted in growing demands for deregulation and
new forms of regulatory exemption and scientific self-regulation (Darrow
et al., 2015; Hogle and Das, 2017).
New alliances and networks of patient organizations, researchers, private
clinics and small-to-mid size biotech companies have sought to maximize exper-
imental and clinical freedoms, and to minimize the controls of drug regulatory
agencies and the high costs and restrictions that characterize the formal drug
approval process (Rosemann and Chaisinthop, 2016). These demands go
beyond the pharmaceutical industry’s attempts to lobby for accelerated review
and market approval (as referred to above), in that they seek to legitimate
profit-oriented experimental medical intervention independent of the review
procedures of drug regulatory agencies and outside the EBM paradigm.
Patient organizations, free market health advocates and professional lobby
groups that include private clinics and smaller biomedical enterprises have advo-
cated for access to experimental medicines on the basis of a market-driven logic
of supply and demand, under new forms of scientific and professional self-regu-
lation (Turner and Knoepfler, 2016). For example, in more than 30 US States
these claims have resulted in right-to-try laws that enable access to investigative
medical strategies after preliminary forms of safety testing. Patients are liable for
all costs and consequences of these experimental treatments, including expenses
from negative adverse effects (Darrow et al., 2015).
Similar developments can be observed in other countries (Rosemann and
Chaisinthop, 2016). Many experts and government agencies are critical of
these developments, however, and states and state-led regulatory authorities
have a sustained interest in continuing to regulate and control access to new
medicines. That being said, the debates and types of regulatory responses
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through which a balance between state and market-led forms of medicine regu-
lation is sought to be realized differ widely between countries.
Four Dynamics of Regulatory Change: Comparative Study
Integrating previous STS explanations, this section analyses plural divergences
from the EBMmodel through regulatory changes in six jurisdictions: Argentina,
China, the European Union, India, Japan and the USA.
Pharmaceutical-oriented Model of Cellular Therapy Development1
The first regulatory frameworks for cell and stem cell therapies evolved in the
USA and the European Union in the mid-2000s. Regulatory authorities in
both the USA and the EU initially opted for a ‘cells-as-drugs’ approach for
stem cell treatments, which has been modeled on a pharmaceutical-based
model of clinical testing and market approval. This approach is committed to
the evidence-based medicine system and the use of multi-phase clinical trial
system, with the randomized controlled trial (RCT) as gold standard. It also
involved compliance with international best practice guidelines such as GCP
(good clinical practice), GTP (good tissue practice), and GMP (good manufac-
turing practice). These guidelines were initially designed to control the author-
ization and licensing of drug products by the pharmaceutical industry (Carson
and Dent, 2007).
The USA was the first country to issue a formal regulation for the clinical use
and market approval of stem cell interventions. FDA regulations went into effect
on 25 May 2005 with the interim rule Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and
Tissue-Based Products: Donor Screening and Testing, and Related Labeling
(FDA, 2005). On 19 June 2007 this interim rule was adopted as a final rule,
without change, and released as the US FDA’s Regulation For Human, Cellular
and Tissue Products (HCT/Ps) (FDA, 2007). This regulatory framework intro-
duced a risk-based, tiered approach that regulates stem cells as biological pro-
ducts within two categories: ‘351 products’ and ‘361 products’ (FDA, 2007).
The ‘361’ category refers to minimally manipulated stem cells that are applied
for homologous use. ‘361’ cells are considered as low-risk and are exempt from
pre-market approval by the FDA. They can be used in patients under compli-
ance with the US human tissue regulation (Sipp and Turner, 2012). The ‘351’
category, on the other hand, refers to cells that are more than minimally
manipulated and to cells that are used in a non-homologous manner. These
cells are classified as a biological drug product and they are subject to US
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) pre-market approval. ‘351’ biological
products (which comprise the majority of stem cell interventions) must ‘by
law […] go through the multi-phase drug pipeline approval process starting
after pre- clinical studies with an Investigational New Drug (IND) application
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and proceeding to Phase 1 trials’ and then to Phase II and III trials (Knoepfler,
2015). With this commitment to rigorous EBM principles and the methodologi-
cal standards of industry-sponsored drug trials, US regulators have prioritized a
slow development process that requires systematic evidence for safety and
efficacy.
Regulatory arrangements for stem cell treatments in the EU are similar to the
US model. Cells that are more than minimally manipulated and used in non-
homologous contexts are defined as ‘medicinal products’ and are regulated
under the Advanced Therapy Medicinal Products (ATMP) legislation, which
was issued by the European Medicines Agency (EMA) in November 2007. Mini-
mally manipulated autologous stem cells, on the other hand, are regulated under
the human tissue legislations of European member states, and not centrally
under EMA (EMA, 2015). The ATMP regulation has harmonized regulatory
approaches for clinical stem cell research in EU member states, to enable clinical
collaborations and cross-country approval of stem cell products outside of the
EU. As in the USA, the EMA regulation demands evidence from systematic
clinical studies, typically from multiphase trials.
Salter, Zhou and Datta have interpreted the emerging of these regulatory
models in the EU and the USA as a ‘hegemonic […] science-based paradigm
of stem cell innovation,’ that is grounded into the scientific, regulatory and econ-
omic history of high-income countries (2015, p. 156). This ‘biomedical hege-
mony of expertise, governance and values’ (Salter et al., 2015, p. 156) has also
informed the adoption of a ‘cells-as-drugs’ regulatory approach in other
countries.
In India, for example, the Drug Controller General India (DCGI) announced
in 2014 that stem cells were to be treated as a drug product and that clinical trials
and pre-market approval had to conform to the Indian Drugs and Cosmetics
Act, which included a new section on stem cells (Tiwari and Raman, 2014).
With these adjustments, the regulation of clinical stem cell research was put
under statutory law and – at least on paper – subjected to the same methodologi-
cal requirements as pharmaceutical research (Tiwari and Raman, 2014). In prac-
tice, however, regulatory requirements are not implemented evenly. As we show
below, a highly flexible situation exists; stem cell trials continue to be conducted
outside of DCGI control and unapproved for-profit interventions with stem cells
are offered in many hospitals (Bhagavati, 2015).
In Argentina, on the other hand, stem cell interventions have until now not
been regulated as medical products but as a medical procedure, which are
managed by the Argentinean Transplant Act under the authority of the
Unique Central Institute for Ablation and Implantation (INCUCAI), a
subunit of Argentina’s Ministry of Health. However, and as in the USA and
the EU, all types of stem cell therapy (with the exception of hematopoietic cell
transplants from human bone marrow) are considered investigational in Argen-
tina and therefore require evaluation of safety and efficacy through multi-phase
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trials (Arzuaga, 2013). At present, the clinical use of stem cells is regulated under
the Ministerial Resolution No. 610/2007 from the Argentinean Ministry of
Health. However, this situation is gradually changing (Arzuaga, 2013). In
2011, regulation 7075/2011of Argentina’s National Administration of Drugs,
Food and Medical Technology (ANMAT) decided that more than minimally
modified cellular products should be classified as Advanced Therapeutic Medic-
inal Products (ATMP). This is a clear shift toward the adoption of the US-Euro-
pean model. At present, though, ANMAT has still no legal authority to enforce
approval of stem cells treatments under its rule, and it has not been decided in
which situation researchers should apply at ANMAT or INCUCAI (Arzuaga,
2013; MSTIA, 2016).
In China a different situation exists. The development of a regulatory frame-
work for clinical stem cell applications has been a long and ongoing process in
China, and considerably slower than for instance in the EU or USA. As in India,
a large market of experimental for-profit interventions with stem cells emerged
in the early 2000s, which were offered to patients outside of state control
(McMahon, 2014). After several attempts to address this situation (Sui and Slee-
boom-Faulkner, 2015), the Chinese National Health and Family Planning Com-
mission (NHFPC) and the China Food and Drug Administration (CFDA)
jointly issued the Regulation for Clinical Stem Cell Research in 2015. This regu-
lation states that the clinical translation of stem cell-based approaches must
occur through systematic clinical studies, which must follow from sound pre-
clinical evidence.
With this evolving regulatory approach the Chinese authorities have taken a
vital step toward international integration and compliance with regulatory
requirements in the USA and EU; a step that is conducive for international
trial collaborations and multi-country approval of stem cell treatments devel-
oped in China. At present, there are still numerous unresolved questions with
this framework. A first set of questions concerns the exact methodological
requirements that will be required in pre-market evaluations. In the 2015 guide-
lines, this point remained undefined, and updated information has so far not
been published (Chen, 2017).
It is still unclear whether stem cells shall be regulated as a pharmaceutical
product or a medical technology or procedure, and also which types of clinical
studies the NHFPC and CFDA require before approving routine clinical use.
The 2015 regulation only speaks of ‘clinical studies’ that shall be conducted
according to ‘scientific principles,’ but the precise nature of these ‘principles’
remains undefined (Rosemann and Sleeboom-Faulkner, 2016). A second set
of questions concerns implementation; it is at present not clear whether the
Chinese authorities have the political will to mobilize sufficient resources and
administrative infrastructures to consistently implement this new regulatory
model (Rosemann and Sleeboom-Faulkner, 2016; Chen, 2017; Zhang, 2017).
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Research on the Internet suggests that unapproved for-profit interventions con-
tinue to exist next to formally approved clinical trials.
In Japan, pre-market evaluation of stem cell therapies was initially based on a
similar regulatory model as in the USA and EU. Until 2013, stem cell interven-
tions were regulated under the Pharmaceutical Affairs Law (PAL) and treated
either as pharmaceutical drug products, medical devices or combination pro-
ducts (Azuma, 2015). This regulatory pathway involved systematic multi-
phase trials and compliance with good clinical practice (GCP) standards
(Azuma, 2015). Then in 2013, in order to capitalize on the therapeutic
promise of induced pluripotent stem (iPS) cells, the Japanese government aban-
doned its commitment to the EBM multi-phase trial approach by introducing a
radical regulatory reform that allowed for conditional, limited-term market
approval of stem cell products after early-phase clinical trials (Cyranoski, 2013).
The adoption of a pharmaceutical-oriented regulatory model for cellular
therapy development in the USA, EU, India, Argentina and initially in Japan
has formed a basis for international harmonization, which facilitates multi-
country trials and cross-border marketing. Efforts of regulatory harmonization
are exemplified, for instance, by the 2016 Guidelines for Stem Cell Research
and Clinical Translation by the International Society for Stem Cell Research
(ISSCR, 2016) or by the ATMP Cluster of the US Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), EMA and Health Canada (Arcidiacono et al., 2012). With its commit-
ment to the EBM system, the use of multiphase controlled trials and the adop-
tion of industry standards (such as GCP, GMP and GTP), the ‘cells-as-drugs’
regulatory approach favors a slow development process, which prioritizes
long-term safety and systematic evidence of the efficacy of stem cell-based treat-
ments (Knoepfler, 2015; Hogle and Das, 2017).
However, as regulations for the market approval of pharmaceutical products,
a ‘cells-as-drugs’ approach favors the commercial interests of large companies,
above the interests and possibilities of academic investigators (Faulkner,
2017). Large companies have both the financial means and the administrative
resources to implement large-scale trials, while academic researchers and
smaller biotech companies do typically struggle or fail to fund such trials and
to comply to the regulatory requirements that a ‘cells-as-drugs’ approach
entails (Hauskeller et al., 2017). However, by seeking to serve the commercial
interests of large commercial stakeholders, a pharmaceutical-based regulatory
model for cellular therapy does not only disadvantage and exclude smaller sta-
keholders, it also increases the costs of the development process of cellular treat-
ments (Savage, 2015). Considering the high developments costs of many stem
cell treatments, it is still uncertain whether and what types of therapies will even-
tually meet the cost-effectiveness criteria of public health care systems in
different countries and to what extent patients will be able to access these treat-
ments on the private market (Tabar and Studer, 2014).
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Emergence of non-standard pathways for market approval
The second dynamic of regulatory diversification that we describe in this article
is the surfacing of an increasing number of exceptions and exemptions (Faul-
kner, 2017) in the regulation of stem cell and regenerative medicine. These
non-standard pathways for market approval have emerged either as alternatives
to or as adjustments of the ‘cells-as-drugs’ regulatory approach. These comp-
lementary regulatory strategies have been designed and are implemented by
national-level drug regulatory authorities. By lowering regulatory standards
and by enabling alternative forms of clinical testing, these strategies seek to inte-
grate a wider range of stakeholders into the innovation process, and also to
increase access to investigational treatments at an earlier stage and to a larger
group of patients (Salter et al., 2015; Faulkner, 2017).
In the USA, the FDA has introduced three types of non-standard pathways
since 2012, which can also be granted to human cell and tissue products
(Knoepfler, 2015). These regulatory exceptions aim at: (1) speeding up the tran-
sition from preclinical to clinical testing (‘fast track approval’) (FDA, 2017a); (2)
accelerating the authorization of phase I and II clinical trials that involve
seriously ill patients with low life expectancy (‘accelerated approval’) (FDA,
2017b); and (3) more rapid clinical testing of ‘breakthrough therapies’ that
have the potential to treat a serious or potentially life threatening disease (‘break-
through therapy designation’) (FDA, 2017c).
In addition to these recent regulatory exceptions, the FDA also operates a ‘pri-
ority review’ procedure, which was introduced in 1992. Priority review aims to
expedite the duration of the evaluation process that precedes market approval of
a new drug (six instead of ten months), after the completion of the clinical trial
period (FDA, 2017d). A fifth exception is the ‘expanded access’ program (also
called ‘compassionate use program’). This program provides patients access to
investigational new treatments parallel to (but outside of) FDA-approved
phase II and III clinical trials (FDA, 2017e). The expanded use program dates
back to 1987, but was revised in 2009 to ensure ‘broad and equitable access to
investigational drugs for treatment,’ including access to biological drug products
(FDA, 2017f).
In the EU, the EMA introduced a similar range of non-standard pathways.
For example, the EMA has also introduced a ‘compassionate use’ program,
which allows access to new drugs and biological products (including stem cell
products) outside of premarket clinical trials (EMA, 2017a). More recently,
the EMA has introduced a ‘conditional market approval’ scheme (EMA,
2017b), which can be used also for stem cell interventions. According to this
scheme, a stem cell product can be licensed at a later stage of a phase III trial,
when data collection for efficacy and safety has almost been completed.
Unlike in the USA, however, the EMA introduced a so-called ‘hospital
exemption’ program for stem cell interventions. This program allows for the
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provision of cellular medicinal products to individual patients ‘in a European
hospital under the exclusive professional responsibility of a doctor’ (MacGregor
et al., 2015). These hospital exemptions are authorized for use by the regulatory
authority in the country in which the product is applied. As a result, the hospital
exemption scheme has been implemented unevenly across EU member states
(Faulkner, 2017). In some countries the scheme has been used to approve
large numbers of experimental interventions and has created ‘the opportunity
for a legal market of authorised stem cell therapy products to emerge within
the province of the clinical professionalism’ (Salter et al., 2015, p. 165).
Salter et al. (2015) explain the rising number of regulatory exceptions and
exemptions in the EU and USA as resulting from the growing influence of
health consumers, who challenge ‘the hegemony of the science-based paradigm
of stem cell innovation through the exercise of their demand in a global market’
(p. 162). This challenge, according to the authors, has resulted in gradual forms
of ‘hegemonic adaptation,’ through which governments have amended national
regulatory frameworks to ‘enable greater responsiveness to health consumer
needs’ (Salter et al., 2015, p. 162). Faulkner (2017) has also pointed out that
the ‘hospital exemption scheme’ in the EU has been designed to enable more
localized, physician-based forms of clinical innovation, so as to counter the
‘industry bias’ that underlies the EMA’s ATMP regulation.
While these explanations account for the situation in the USA and EU, they
do not necessarily apply to the emerging of regulatory exceptions and special
rules in other countries. In Argentina, for example, regulatory exceptions that
have enabled the provision of stem cell interventions outside of multi-phase
trials (which are required by the country’s national-level regulatory authorities)
have emerged for a different reason. Because Argentina is a federal country in
which national regulatory authorities have legal power only when medical pro-
ducts cross its provincial borders or are involved in foreign trade, federal regu-
lations are not applicable at the provincial level. This means that as long as
medical treatments or services are applied exclusively within the geographic jur-
isdiction of the different Argentinean provinces, federal regulations have no legal
power and only provincial regulations apply (Arzuaga, 2013, p. 41). As a result,
there is currently no effective control over stem cell-based clinical applications
within the different Argentinean provinces, as long as these interventions are
not offered to patients from other provinces, or are not shipped across provincial
or state borders (Krmpotic, 2011).
Non-standard pathways that aim to accelerate the clinical innovation process
have also emerged in China and India. The Drug Controller General of India
(DCGI) eased its rules for clinical research in 2016, and has reportedly halved
the time for clinical testing and market approval; further regulatory reforms
to fast track the clinical development process are currently underway (Raghavan,
2016). China has also tried to speed up the approval of innovative drugs and
medicinal products. In order to develop its domestic pharmaceutical sector, in
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2016 Chinese regulators initiated reforms aimed at expediting the clinical
research process and speeding up market approval of urgently needed drugs
(Deere, 2016).
Regulatory exceptions and exemptions have played an important role in the
growing availability of stem cell-based treatments outside the multi-phase trial
process in the USA, EU, and, for different reasons, Argentina. In contrast, in
India and China the widespread availability of unproven or non-systematically
proven stem cell treatments can be explained through the flexible implemen-
tation, and at times complete disregard, of existing regulatory rules.
Flexible Enforcement of Regulatory Standards
A third dynamic of regulatory diversification that can be observed in the stem
cell field is the flexible enforcement and non-observance of regulatory require-
ments, which has enabled the long-term provision of experimental for-profit
interventions with stem cells outside of the review and control structures of
regulatory agencies. This has happened for several years in India and China,
where governments responded only gradually to a flourishing grey-area
market in experimental stem cell interventions (Sleeboom-Faulkner et al.,
2016). These developments are not only restricted to the stem cell field, but
exist also in other areas of experimental medicine (Holdaway et al., 2015).
Unapproved for-profit therapies continued to be tolerated in these two
countries even after the introduction of national regulatory frameworks that for-
mally prohibit stem cell interventions outside of formally approved clinical
trials. As mentioned above, in China, the 2015 Regulation for Clinical Stem
Cell Research has explicitly stated that the clinical translation of stem cell-
based approaches must occur through systematic clinical studies, which must
follow from sound pre-clinical evidence (Rosemann and Sleeboom-Faulkner,
2016). The core of this regulation is that stem cell trials can only be conducted
in specifically authorized research hospitals and that for-profit applications of
experimental stem cell interventions are legally prohibited (Rosemann and Slee-
boom-Faulkner, 2016). If this rule would be implemented, it would mean the
delimitation of clinical stem cell interventions to a small number of elite hospi-
tals. It would also mean the systematic shutting down of numerous for-profit
stem cell clinics (Rosemann and Sleeboom-Faulkner, 2016).
In India, the 2013 Guidelines for Stem Cell Research (and previously the 2007
Guidelines for Stem Cell Research and Therapy) have formally prohibited the use
of stem cells in human patients, except in the context clinical trials approved by
India’s health authorities (Viswanathan et al., 2013). Despite these formal regu-
latory prohibitions, however, large private hospitals and medical corporations
have continued to offer their services on the Internet in both countries.
Of interest here is the fact that the toleration of unapproved stem cell thera-
pies is by no means limited to middle-income countries, but can also be
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observed, more recently, in the USA. In recent years, the FDA has taken a more
relaxed approach to clinics that have offered autologous stem cell interventions
to patients, which have sprouted all over the country over the last 8–10 years.
According to research conducted in 2015, there are at present more than 350
US private clinics and businesses offering direct-to-consumer stem cell interven-
tions to medical consumers, which have not been authorized by the US FDA.
These interventions did not only include autologous stem cell treatments, but
also interventions with autologous stem cells from multiple sources, and at
least one clinic claimed to offer even human embryonic stem cell-based inter-
ventions (Turner and Knoepfler, 2016). This large number of clinics is expected
to grow further, with a growing number of right-to-try laws in the USA and
recent regulatory changes introduced by the 21st Century Cures Act, which
will be discussed in the next section.
Salter (2008) has interpreted the lenient regulatory environment for stem cell
research and therapies in China and India as a deliberate strategy to situate these
countries in a new and competitive global market, in which these countries had
traditionally little or no experience. Sleeboom-Faulkner (2016) has in this regard
pointed out that both India and China have sought to pursue a ‘flexible’ or ‘dual’
regulatory strategy that aims to serve the interests of scientific and corporate
elites in these countries (by providing possibilities for formal regulatory approval
that would allow for international trial collaborations and cross-border market-
ing), and less well-funded local researchers, hospitals and corporations (by tol-
erating gray-area clinical applications and business practices exterior to formal
regulatory rules).
Linear logics of bench-to-bedside translation strategies are, as a result of this
flexible and regulatory approach, often reversed (Chen, 2017). Promising
approaches with new cell types are often tested first in patients, then explored
further in the laboratory, and subsequently back to the clinic, either as for-
profit experimental interventions, or in the context of more systematized pilot
studies or clinical trials (Rosemann and Sleeboom-Faulkner, 2016; Prasad,
2017).
However, the flexible enforcement and sidelining of regulatory requirements
comes at a cost. While it enables localized clinical innovation among less well-
funded researchers and corporations, and provides rapid access to potentially
helpful treatments for patients, these treatments mostly do not result in conclus-
ive evidence of efficacy and safety (Zhang, 2017). Even though real ‘snake oil’
applications may in fact be rare, the risk of exposure to ineffective and unsafe
interventions, and also the risk of financial exploitation of patients increase in
such an environment (Lysaght, 2017). Other risks of the flexible implementation
of regulatory rules are reputational risks (Salter, 2008), as well as a loss of trust in
the regulatory capacities of the government, including among scientific elites
and corporations in these countries (Zhang, 2017).
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Abandonment of the Multiphase Trial System
The fourth and most far-reaching process of regulatory diversification that is
currently taking place in biomedical research is characterized by the complete
abandonment of the multiphase trial EBM system. This is exemplified most
drastically in Japan’s regulatory reform of the translational pathway for investi-
gative medicines, devices, gene therapies and regenerative medicine products, as
well as in the introduction of the 21st Century Cure Act in the USA.
In May 2013 the Japanese National Diet passed the Regenerative Medicine
Promotion Act [RMPA] (Government of Japan, 2013a), which formed the start-
ing point of a radical regulatory reform. The RMPA was followed by the passing
of the Amended Pharmaceutical Affairs Law, which went into effect in Novem-
ber 2014 (Government of Japan, 2013b; Sipp, 2015). Under the amended PAL
the conditions for the clinical application of stem cell interventions changed sig-
nificantly (Azuma, 2015). The amended law allowed for conditional, limited-
term market approval of stem cell products after early-phase clinical trials. Con-
ditional approval can occur after positive clinical data from as few as ten patients
(Cyranoski, 2013), provided these first-in-human-trials demonstrate that the
tested cell products are safe and ‘likely to predict efficacy’ (Sipp, 2015). Once
approved by the Japanese Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices Agency
(PMDA), clinical trial sponsors have the possibility to seek market approval
for up to seven years (Sipp, 2015). Clinical efficacy is tested in this time
period in post-marketing procedures (Miyata, 2013).
This is a significant shift away from the multiphase RCT system, which has
emerged as the methodological gold standard in medicine research in recent
decades. This break, and the possibility of time-limited conditional market
approval after evidence from small numbers of patients, is likely to have reper-
cussions for the regulation of stem cell research in other countries, and possibly
also other fields of medicine research.
It is noteworthy that conditionally approved stem cell interventions are eli-
gible for reimbursement by the Japanese health insurance system (Government
of Japan, 2013a). Costs for these experimental treatments are split between the
state and patients at a ratio of 70:30 (Sipp, 2015). This is a significant change to
the financing of research and development (R&D) costs for medicine research,
which typically requires long-standing corporate or government investments
before development costs can be recouped through health insurance reimburse-
ment and consumer charges.
According to Sipp (2015), this evolving regulatory model in Japan has relaxed
the need to demonstrate the clinical utility of cellular products prior to market-
ing, and raises critical questions regarding the testing of safety and treatment
efficacy. As Sipp (2015) points out, with this new approach ‘Japan clearly
hopes to compete and succeed in the race to build a regenerative medicine indus-
try by flattening a few hurdles.’ It is likely that other countries will follow the
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Japanese regulatory model, or at least create additional types of regulatory excep-
tions in which (conditional) market approval of stem cell therapies can be
granted without preceding phase I‒III trials.
In fact, exactly this has now happened in the USA. The 21st Century Cure Act,
which was approved by the US Congress in December 2016, has introduced
further possibilities to accelerate market approval of new medicines by
offering possibilities to avoid going through rigorous, large-scale phase III
trials (Kesselheim and Avorn, 2017) and by promoting methodological alterna-
tives to the multi-phase trial system, such as adaptive and other new trial designs
(Montgomery, 2017). The passing of the Act in December 2016 has the potential
to lead to a transition into a post-RCT world, which will impact the development
of stem cells and many other medical treatments.
As Kesselheim and Avorn (2017) state, advocates have praised the Act as a
‘means of speeding drug development’ and to decrease ‘the cost and duration
of drugs and devices development. This has involved various provisions
designed to ‘reduce the amount and rigor of clinical testing before new drugs
and devices can be approved for use’ (Kesselheim and Avorn, 2017). These
include the use of alternative, less rigorous forms of evidence, such as observa-
tional data and self-reporting of ‘patient experience’ that were previously
deemed as too subjective and unacceptable in the context of FDA approval pro-
cedures (Kesselheim and Avorn, 2017).
Many of the regulatory changes introduced by the 21st Century Cure Act will
also apply to stem cell treatments, but it remains to be seen how applications for
specific types of stem cell-based interventions are handled in practice. A related
development in the USA has been ‘right-to-try’ legislation at the State level,
which offers patients and physicians the choice to use not yet approved investi-
gational drugs (including cellular medicines) entirely outside of the regulatory
control of the FDA (Darrow et al., 2015).
Japan’s shift away from the multi-phase trial system has been interpreted as
an effort to increase international competitiveness (Lysaght, 2017) and to create
an edge that would allow researchers and companies in Japan to translate Shinya
Yamanka’s discovery of iPS cells into new treatments and economic profits
before other countries (Mikami, 2015; Sipp, 2015). By shortening the clinical
evaluation process and allowing conditional market approval after small
numbers of patients, Japan’s regulatory reform enables profit making at a very
early stage of the development process (Lysaght, 2017). By abandoning the
need for costly multiphase trials, it also reduces the development costs for
stem cell-based interventions.
The Japanese model, no doubt, will appeal to researchers and companies in
many countries, which will likely increase pressure on other national regulatory
authorities to make similar regulatory reforms. Moreover, as with the 21st
Century Cure Act, the Japanese approach to cell-based therapies enables patients
to access these interventions at a very early stage, instead of having to wait until
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to a later stage of the clinical trial process, or even many years until a new medi-
cine is formally approved and legally available on the market.
Discussion
This article asked firstly: How do recent regulatory changes there diverge from
the EBMmodel, and how do these changes vary across countries? And secondly,
what tensions and consequences arise as a result of these changes? These are dis-
cussed below in turn.
Divergences from EMB Model
Regarding the first question, our findings indicate that the regulatory conditions
that lead to the routine clinical use and commercialization of new medical inter-
ventions are subject to far-reaching changes. Although the EBM model is still
influential, it is increasingly contested and being partly replaced. While our
empirical analysis has focused on regulatory developments for stem cell-based
medical treatments, the described changes represent a wider process of diversifi-
cation that is currently taking place in the regulation of medicine research at a
global scale.
In the six jurisdictions we analyzed, four different dynamics of regulatory
change could be observed with reference to stem cells. The first is the emergence
of a pharmaceutical-oriented model of cellular therapy development, with the
multi-phase trial system remaining at the core. The origins of this model lie
in the USA and EU, where regulators in the mid-2000s developed a regulatory
approach for stem cell medicine modeled on the clinical evaluation of pharma-
ceuticals. In the early 2010s, this ‘cells-as-drugs’ approach was adopted by regu-
latory bodies in Argentina, Japan, and, at least at the level of intent, in India and
China. With the exception of Japan, where regulators initiated a different regu-
latory approach in 2013, the ‘cells-as-drugs’ model remains influential in these
jurisdictions for corporate-sponsored research, which targets the development
of ‘off-the-shelf’ stem cell products.
A second process of regulatory change was the emerging of a growing number
of non-standard pathways for market approval that accelerate and shorten clini-
cal evaluation procedures, and in some cases enable clinical innovation and for-
profit applications without the use of multi-phase trials. These regulatory excep-
tions and exemptions have emerged especially in strictly regulated high-income
countries such as the EU and USA. New rules to fast-track clinical testing have
more recently also been issued in India, China and Argentina. These non-stan-
dard pathways are partly the result of pressure from the pharmaceutical industry
to ease regulatory rules for drug development (Montgomery, 2017), partly the
outcome of pressure from patients and consumer organizations to increase
access to investigational treatments (Salter et al., 2015), and partly the effect
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of criticism from professional medical organizations that seek to enable more
localized, physician or hospital-based forms of innovation (Cooper and
Waldby, 2014; Faulkner, 2017).
A third regulatory development was the flexible enforcement of regulatory
standards, which allows local clinics and companies to circumvent regulatory
rules. The toleration of clinical for-profit interventions that disregard regulatory
requirements has emerged especially in low-to-middle income countries, with
India, China, and Argentina, at a provincial level, as examples. Salter (2008)
argues the flexible handling of regulatory controls in such rapidly developing
countries is a way to increase competitiveness in an environment where regulat-
ory conditions are mainly shaped by transnational corporations and regulatory
authorities of high-income countries.
In a related argument, Sleeboom-Faulkner (2016) stresses that for many
researchers in low-to-middle income countries participation in highly expensive
‘bona fide’ projects remains out of reach. Participation in ‘grey area’ research and
applications is, for many stakeholders, the only feasible way to take part in the
innovation process. From this perspective, the adaptable enforcement of regulat-
ory standards simultaneously facilitates international integration and local inno-
vation practices that would be delegitimized if (inter)national rules were strictly
enforced (Timmermans and Epstein, 2010; Sleeboom-Faulkner et al., 2016).
The fourth type of regulatory change that this article has described was the
abandonment of the multi-phase trial EBM system. This has happened with
Japan’s regulatory reform in 2013, in which the translational pathway for inves-
tigative therapies, devices, gene therapies and regenerative medicine products is
shortened and conditional market approval is permitted after clinical tests in
small numbers of patients. More than three years after the introduction of
Japan’s regulatory reform, the 21st Century Cures Act in the USA has introduced
similar changes that enable commercialization before large-scale phase III trials,
and permit the use of alternative, less rigorous forms of clinical evidence that was
previously unacceptable for FDA approval procedures. Moreover, with the con-
tinuing expansion of ‘right-to-try’ legislation in the USA, growing numbers of
patients can now gain access to investigational medical interventions at an
early stage of the clinical testing process, outside of FDA controls.
As pointed out by Hogle and Das (2017), these changes disrupt long-held
beliefs about what counts as credible data and the methodological procedures
through which evidence is constructed. Nevertheless, the drivers that underlie
these changes in the two countries vary. In Japan, on the one hand, regulatory
hurdles have been flattened to facilitate the clinical development and commer-
cialization of induced pluripotent stem cells (a domestic discovery) and to pos-
ition the country as a global leader in this field and for other innovative
treatments (Mikami, 2015). In the USA, on the other hand, the shift away
from the EBM/multiphase RCT system has been driven by long-term advocacy
for deregulation and free market healthcare and pressure from patient
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organizations (Cooper and Waldby, 2014), as well as lobbying by the pharma-
ceutical industry, in an attempt to reduce drug development costs and to sell
drugs to consumers faster (Montgomery, 2017).
Tensions and Consequences
Which tensions and consequences arise as a result of these changes? To answer
this question we draw on the analytical framework introduced earlier, which dis-
cussed a set of conflicting choices that play key roles in the formation of medi-
cine regulation. In each of the four regulatory developments that this article has
described, the research process and regulatory rules that lead to commercializa-
tion and routine clinical applications vary significantly. Key regulatory concepts
such as evidence, safety, risks, efficacy, responsibility and accountability acquire
different meanings. This is reflected in the adoption of conflicting methodologies
and regimes of evidence, differing processes of audit and peer review, and the use
of divergent ethical and safety standards. These differences result in tensions
between different types of practices and stakeholders and have implications
for knowledge producers, national governments, health care systems and
patients.
The ‘cells-as-drugs’ approach, which is based on the EBM/multi-phase trial
system, favors especially the interests of large biotech and pharmaceutical com-
panies as well as well-funded researchers, mostly in high-income countries.
Because multi-phase trials can be conducted in a standardized way across mul-
tiple institutions in different countries, this approach facilitates international
integration, collaboration and market approval of new medical interventions
in multiple jurisdictions.
However, and as Timmermans and Epstein (2010) point out, international
harmonization of regulatory standards stratifies social systems and can result
in new forms of exclusion. The global diffusion of the standardized EBM/
RCT system, for example, has threatened the autonomy of individual prac-
titioners, which has precluded and delegitimized physician-based forms of
experimental medical practice (Knaapen, 2014). In the stem cell field, this
has resulted in a power struggle between different professional groups, which
has driven processes of regulatory diversification at both national and inter-
national levels.
At a national level a struggle exists between the regulatory needs of large cor-
porations and academic elite researchers who benefit from participation in the
EBM/RCT system, and researchers, clinics and smaller corporations who do
not have the means to conduct multi-phase trials. The growing number of regu-
latory exceptions that this article has discussed and the use of new clinical meth-
odologies as introduced by the 21st Century Cures Act in the USA and the
conditional approval system in Japan all seek to address and solve this
tension; for example, by allowing new types of practitioners (individual
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physicians, academic researchers, small-to-mid size companies, private hospi-
tals) to take part in the clinical innovation process.
At an international level, a conflict of interest exists between medical
researchers and companies in low-to-middle income countries and high-
income countries. This explains why opposition to the international EBM/
RCT system has been especially pronounced among innovators in less wealthy
countries, whose business practices, livelihoods and clinical interventions are
threatened by regulatory standards from high-income countries.
Both, the creation of new regulatory exceptions/exemptions and the flexible
enforcement of regulatory standards indicate a shift towards deregulation and
increased self-governance. The hospital exemption scheme in the EU and the
growing number of right-to-try laws and more independence for individual
medical practitioners in the USA suggest that – outside of the regulation of
pharmaceutical drugs – state intervention is downsized and partly replaced by
more market-oriented medical interventions and self-regulation by medical
institutions and associations.
A consequence of deregulation is, however, that the oversight of experimental
medical interventions are shaped and enacted by professional networks with
vested interests, which can undermine scientific credibility and public trust.
For patients, deregulation and the acceptance of less rigorous methodological
standards creates a tension between earlier and more widespread access to
potentially helpful treatments and higher risks of adverse effects and financial
as well as psychological exploitation. Less regulatory oversight and the accep-
tance of less reliable forms of clinical evidence mean also less certainty regarding
the efficacy and clinical utility of new treatments.
Conclusion
This article has analyzed regulatory developments in stem cell medicine,
especially divergences from evidence-based medicine (EBM) paradigm, centered
on the multi-phase RCT system. It compared changes in and across six jurisdic-
tions (USA, EU, China, India, Argentina, and Japan). Summarizing answers to
our main questions: Amidst far-reaching regulatory changes, the EBM model is
still influential but is being partly replaced. Across the six regulatory jurisdic-
tions, the case studies illustrate four dynamics: pharmaceutical-oriented
models of cellular therapy development, non-standard pathways of market
approval, flexible enforcement of regulatory standards, and replacement of the
multi-phase trial (EBM model). These changes involve tensions around four
pairs of conflicting regulatory choices (see previous sub-section for details).
In informing debates on the changing politics of evidence and legitimization
in medicine research, this article has wider implications for the Science and
Technology Studies literature on medical regulation. A first point is that, in
order to understand the process of global diversification that is currently
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taking place in medicine regulation, more comparative research is needed that
can account for different regulatory approaches and that is able to explain
why some countries choose one approach and others another. Single-country
studies, or a primary concern with developments in high-income countries,
fall short in this regard because they highlight factors that are significant
within individual countries, but may overlook aspects that are relevant in
other countries. A comparative framework also enables the identification of
transnational patterns and developments and analysis of legislative and regulat-
ory strategies in different countries, and how these influence each other.
A second point is that many studies that have analyzed recent changes in
medicine regulation have used a relatively limited set of explanatory factors.
This is reflected in various studies we have cited and discussed in this
article. Montgomery (2017), for example, has particularly focused on the
role of the pharmaceutical industry in trying to replace the RCT as methodo-
logical gold standard in medicine regulation. Salter et al. (2015) have inter-
preted the ongoing process of regulatory diversification in the EU and USA
as a form of ‘hegemonic adaptation,’ through which governments respond to
new demands from patient and consumer organizations. Cooper and
Waldby (2014), alternatively, have pointed to the influence of neoliberal
ideas and libertarian advocates of pharmaceutical deregulation in explaining
the continuing increase of regulatory exemptions and the relaxation of pre-
market testing. Sleeboom-Faulkner et al. (2016), by contrast, have analyzed
conflicting global developments in medicine regulation through the concept
of ‘national home-keeping.’ This enables them to investigate how national
regulatory bodies in different world regions respond to the exclusionionary
effects of international standards in medicine regulation.
While each of these studies makes an important contribution to understand-
ing current processes of regulatory change, individually they provide key pieces
of a broader puzzle, but fail to account for the complexity of reasons that
underlie the ongoing process of global diversification in medicine regulation.
In order to facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of the current plur-
alization of regulatory models in medicine research and to provide a basis for
international comparisons and the analysis of transnational patterns, we have
combined insights from these studies in an analytical framework that has
explored regulatory developments through the use of four pairs of conflicting
regulatory choices. Work with this framework has enabled us to foreground
both the conflicts of interests and the tensions between different regulatory
aspirations that are relevant in the context of specific countries, and in the emer-
ging of broader global developments.
A third point is, that an analytical concern with medical innovations that are
not amenable to the business model of Big Pharma (i.e. the development of scal-
able, mass-produced medicinal products that can be stored long-term and
shipped across long distances) is of increasing importance to understand
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processes of regulatory change. With the advent of novel medical approaches
that are based on the use of personalized tissue and gene products, which are
biologically fragile and whose storage life is limited, new types of research and
profit-making have emerged, that differ from conventional forms of drug devel-
opment in important respects. The key stakeholders in this emerging innovation
landscape are not large, transnational corporations, but small-to-mid size com-
panies, academic researchers and hospitals, and sometimes private clinics. These
stakeholders have fewer resources and different regulatory needs compared to
pharmaceutical companies, and seek to influence medical regulations in new
ways.
Moreover, many advances in regenerative medicine, gene therapy and tissue
engineering are now developed in rapidly developing countries in Asia and to a
lesser extent South and Middle America and the Middle East. In this changing
innovation landscape, global competition and inequalities have become impor-
tant factors that drive diversification in medicine regulation. International stan-
dardization and harmonization, the hallmark of the Big Pharma model of drug
development is less important in these new areas of medicine. With the signifi-
cance of these emerging medical approaches growing, and health care systems at
a global level coming increasingly under pressure, a further shift towards dereg-
ulation and regulatory diversification can be expected in the future. However, as
medicine regulation diversifies, the boundaries between medical research and
healthcare provision, commerce and humanitarian service, as well as state
control and medical self-regulation are re-defined. The implications of this are
only just coming into view.
Note
1. Some of the data in the empirical section of this article are also published in Rosemann
et al. (2016). However, the data presented here include updates on regulatory develop-
ments from the last two years, are more in-depth, and have been analyzed in the
context of a completely different argument and theoretical discussion.
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